Secrets Management Implementation. @secrets-management

Secrets scattered across env files, CI settings, and old wikis are breaches waiting for a leak. This package moves application and infrastructure secrets into a managed, auditable distribution workflow: one source of truth, access-controlled, rotated, and logged. The finish state is no plaintext secrets in repositories or pipelines, and a rotation you have actually performed, not just planned.

The sprint inventories where secrets really live, migrates them into a managed store such as Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, or Azure Key Vault, wires applications and CI to fetch at runtime, and proves the model by rotating a production credential end to end. Developer workflow is treated as part of the security model: if the safe path is slower than the unsafe one, people take the unsafe one.

Secrets inventory and migration

Every secret found, classified, and migrated; plaintext copies removed from repos and pipelines.

Managed store setup

Vault or your cloud's secrets manager configured with access policies and audit logging.

Rotation and auditing

Rotation procedures implemented and exercised, with access history queryable.

Developer and CI workflow

Runtime injection for applications and pipelines, keeping the secure path the easy path.

1. Scope: inventory secrets and consumers, choose the store, and agree access policies.
2. Build: stand up the store, migrate secrets, wire runtime injection, and purge plaintext copies.
3. Handover: rotate a production credential as the acceptance test, hand over runbooks.

The Secrets Management Implementation is a menu item on the Scrums.com delivery catalog, available at every plan tier. Add it to your plan backlog and your delivery team schedules it like any other item — scoped, tracked, and reported through the SEOP. See Delivery Plan Tiers.

Which secret stores do you implement?

HashiCorp Vault or your cloud's native manager, AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault, or GCP Secret Manager. Scoping picks based on your runtimes and operational appetite.

What about secrets already leaked into git history?

The inventory flags them, affected credentials are rotated as part of the sprint, and history remediation options are laid out. Rotation, not history rewriting, is the primary control.

How does this connect to wider security work?

Secrets management is one control in the pipeline. Automating checks across the delivery path is the DevSecOps Security Automation menu item, which assumes this foundation exists.